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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “Justice is the first virtue of institutions,” with these famous words John Rawls started his 
seminal work A Theory of Justice (1999). For Rawls the justice of a society is the 
consequence of the justice of its institutions. Without these institutions there would simply not 
be any justice, they are an existence condition of justice. This made the primary subject of 
justice the coherent set of institutions which together form a society‟s basic structure (Rawls, 
1999; 3). However, putting the primacy of justice within the basic structure also limited the 
scope of justice to that basic structure and made justice dependent upon its existence (Miller, 
2011: 467). This was a soundly anticosmopolitan conclusion, and following the publishing of 
A Theory of Justice (1999), a vast and lasting debate ensued between cosmopolitan and 
anticosmopolitan philosophers regarding the domestic limitation on the scope of justice, also 
known as the basic structure debate. This thesis will inquire into the arguments put forward by 
both sides of the debate to establish their theoretical plausibility and establish which side has 
put forward the most convincing arguments. As the debate is too expansive to be encapsulated 
in a single thesis, the focus will be upon a particular branch which focused on the 
coerciveness of basic structures and their implications on the scope of justice. This subset of 
the debate came into existence following the critique posited by philosopher Arash Abizadeh, 
who in contrast with the Rawlsian anticosmopolitan conclusion, claimed that Rawls‟s 
argument actually leads to the cosmopolitan conclusion that the scope of justice is global 
(2007: 358). This was a critique internal to Rawlsian logic and has posited a formidable 
obstacle for Rawlsian philosophers arguing for a domestic scope of justice, as will be shown 
in the thesis. In its essence, the Rawlsian argument on the scope of justice was deceivingly 
simple. It is constructed as follows: 
A1: Institutionalist anticosmopolitan basic structure argument (Abizadeh, 2007: 322): 
P1 - The primary subject of justice is society's basic structure. 
P2 - A basic structure global in scope does not exist. 
Therefore:  
C1 - The scope of justice is not global. 
As time progressed, Rawls‟s reasoning became under heavy criticism from institutionalist 
cosmopolitans. One such criticism deserves particular attention for this thesis, Arash 
Abizadeh argued that Rawls mistakenly presupposes that the subject and scope of justice 
coincide, while this is not necessarily the case (2007: 323). He argued that premise P1 limits 
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the subject (institutions) of justice but not its scope (the range of persons whose behavior is 
governed as a consequence of considerations of justice) (Abizadeh, 2007: 323). Thus, 
although the subject of justice is a society‟s basic structure, P1 sets no limits on the range of 
persons governed by a basic structure and consequently fails to limit the scope of justice. It is 
only when the basic structure is perceived as a set of coercive institutions that the site and 
scope of justice coincide (Abizadeh, 2007: 321). But then it would need an additional claim 
telling us how coercion defines the scope of justice, a coercion claim if you will. And 
secondly, Abizadeh questioned in what way justice requires a basic structure, this can be in an 
existence, constitutive, or in an instrumental manner (2007: 324). It is only when a basic 
structure is seen as an existence condition of justice that a coercive understanding of the basic 
structure limits both the site and scope to that basic structure. When a basic structure is 
perceived as a constitutive or an instrumental condition of justice, the lack of a basic structure 
might burden us with the duty to assist in the establishment of a basic structure. Perceived as 
such, “justice demands the realization of those conditions” (2007, 324), it would require us to 
establish a basic structure where none exist and would lead to a cosmopolitan conclusion. 
However, even when a basic structure is seen as an existence condition of justice and 
understood coercively, Abizadeh still argued that it failed to limit the scope of justice (2007: 
320). For him a coercive global basic structure does exist because the interstate system of 
border control policies coerces individuals to refrain from entering a particular territory 
(Abizadeh, 2007: 358). This interlocking system potentially subjects a person to coercion, and 
as the scope of justice is defined by those subject to coercion, they should be included within 
its scope. Abizadeh‟s claim can be summarized as follows:  
A2: Institutionalist cosmopolitan basic structure argument: 
P1 - The primary subject of justice is society's basic structure. 
P4 - A basic structure global in scope does exist. 
Therefore:  
C2 - The scope of justice is global. 
Abizadeh appeared to have given good reasons why the scope of justice is global when 
following Rawlsian logic. However, like others before him, his argument was carefully 
scrutinized by philosophers from the opposing side. On the anticosmopolitan side the 
contributions of Michael Blake (2002), Thomas Nagel (2005), David Miller (2009, 2010, & 
2011), and Mathias Risse (2006) deserve special attention. Their claims can be summarized 
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by Blake‟s argument that “There is no ongoing coercion of the sort observed in the domestic 
arena in the international legal arena” (Blake, 2002: 280). Thus, although international 
institutions and other states might coerce foreigners, this is different from the sort exercised 
by the domestic basic structure and does not give rise to the demand for justification as 
domestic coercion does.  
This leaves us with a philosophical problem centered on premises P2 and P4 and the 
subsequent conclusions regarding the scope of justice C1 and C2. A central theme in the 
debate is the demand for justification arising from coercion and whether all coercion requires 
justification in equal measure. Inquiring into the theoretical plausibility of either basic 
structure argument (A1 & A2) understood coercively requires a deeper understanding of what 
coercion entails. As such, ample attention will be paid to the way in which both sides of the 
debate define coercion. Solving the philosophical puzzle implies answering the main 
question; what is the scope of justice from an institutionalist cosmopolitan or 
anticosmopolitan position while perceiving the basic structure as being coercive in nature? As 
well as answering the sub-questions; (1) what arguments were put forward by both 
cosmopolitans and anticosmopolitans to constitute their arguments. And (2) which of the 
arguments formulated by either party in the debate is most convincing. The first part of the 
thesis will provide a summary introduction of Rawls‟s arguments regarding the primacy of the 
basic structure and how coercion can be limit the scope of justice. The second part will focus 
on the debate following Abizadeh‟s 2007 claim that a coercive global basic structure exists. 
Abizadeh, as will be shown, has put forward a sophisticated argument. Yet, although the 
debate might have subsided, this does not mean it has ended. By answering the above 
mentioned questions I will attempt to contribute to a further development of the global basic 
structure debate (understood coercively), as well as providing a philosophical argument 
against the existence of a global basic structure. 
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Chapter 2: Why the basic structure of society? 
The impact which A Theory of Justice (1999a) had cannot be underestimated, yet the critique 
that was leveled against the domestic limitation of the scope of justice appears cogent in 
hindsight. This section explores the argument that was initially developed by Rawls for 
limiting the scope of justice in A Theory of Justice (1999a), as well as his remarks on the 
nature of institutions in Political Liberalism (1993), as well as his later remarks on the scope 
of justice in The Law of Peoples (1999b). Rawls starts the development of his theory of justice 
by two stark delineations on the scope of justice; it is to be limited to the domestic basic 
structure of society, and the theory applies mainly to well-ordered societies (Rawls, 1999a: 7). 
It is thus to be applied to the specific form of institutions which constitute the basic structure 
of a society. 
The reasons that motivated Rawls to choose for the basic structure as a means to define the 
scope of justice are unclear, but they can be distilled by looking at his remarks regarding the 
subject. Firstly, in Political Liberalism he states that the focus on society as closed is an 
abstraction, but this limitation helps to focus on ”certain main questions free from distracting 
details” (1993: 12). Secondly the basic structure is unique due to “the way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls, 1999a: 6). Institutions are thus a fundamental 
factor that helps shape the lives of individuals living under them. He did acknowledge that the 
law of nations, a law governing justice between peoples, might have to be considered (1993: 
12). However in Law of Peoples (1999b) his focus remained on peoples as the relevant 
institution rather than individuals. As such, “the ideal of a just world for Rawls would have to 
be the ideal of a world of internally just states” rather than a single world state (Nagel, 2005: 
155).  
Rawls provides inspiration to philosophers arguing for a coercive understanding of basic 
structures by claiming that “political power is always coercive power backed by the 
government‟s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in 
upholding its laws” (1993: 136). The notion of coercion as component of law is of crucial 
importance, it is also known as the Coercion Claim (Abizadeh, 2010: 121). A state regularly 
subjects its inhabitants to coercion by virtue of its laws, but this begs the question whether this 
coercion can be justified to the coerced.  The answer to this question can be short; it is found 
in the following principle: 
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The Principle of Liberal Legitimacy (Rawls, 1993: 137):  “Our exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason”.  
Thus, a citizen can be said to be legitimately coerced when the exercise of political power is 
done according to principles which the coercee would‟ve chosen himself, and which are 
mandated by law. Rawls‟s principle is a good example of a hypothetical consent theory. 
Combined with the Coercion Claim this leads to the Coercion Principle of Liberal 
Legitimacy:  
The Coercion Principle of Liberal Legitimacy (Abizadeh, 2010: 121): “Those subject 
to the state‟s laws have a right of democratic participation because such laws subject 
them to coercion.” 
It should have become clear from the above that the Rawlsian limitation on the scope of 
justice stems from the particular moral relation between a citizen and its state, a shared 
institutional structure. It is due to the inescapability of a state‟s coercive directives why the 
primacy of justice lies within the domestic basic structure. It is a particular basic structure 
which coerces you, but it is justified because you are given the right of democratic 
participation in return. The argument amounts to the claim that those subject to coercion 
ought to be included within the scope of justice. Rawls has established an institutional 
anticosmopolitan account of justice based on the coercive nature of institutions. His argument 
failed to convince cosmopolitan philosophers, as will be shown in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: The institutionalist anticosmopolitan position and coercive institutions 
As was shown in the introduction, Abizadeh convincingly argued that Rawls‟s argument fails 
to limit the scope of justice without an additional claim (Abizadeh, 2007: 323). The coercion 
principle of liberal legitimacy constitutes such a claim, yet it requires further explanation. 
Why, for example, does coercion need to be justified? And how does state coercion differs 
from other sources of coercion? Secondly, Rawls appeared to perceive all political power as 
being coercive (1993: 136), yet this understanding is too vague, as laws are not coercive 
without enforcing institutions. How political power can be coercive requires an analysis of the 
articles written by Blake (2002) and Nagel (2005). This chapter focuses on the arguments 
developed by institutionalist anticosmopolitans against a global scope of justice; it focuses on 
the differences between the domestic and the global basic structure, and on different forms of 
coercion. 
One notable anticosmopolitan was Michael Blake, who in the article “Distributive Justice, 
State Coercion, and Autonomy” (2002) explains us how state coercion differs from other 
forms of coercion. He does so by tying the notion of respect for autonomy to state coercion 
(Blake, 2002: 251 & 270 & 288). Like other philosophers writing from a liberal perspective, 
he emphasizes the human capacity for autonomous agency and prefers that all coercion is 
eliminated (2002: 267- 268). However, state coercion is a necessary form of coercion (Blake, 
2002: 273), and if it cannot be eliminated then it ought to be justified. The root of his thinking 
stems from the Autonomy Principle (Blake, 2002: 267): 
Autonomy Principle: All human beings have the moral entitlement to exist as 
autonomous agents, and therefore have entitlements to those circumstances and 
conditions under which this is possible. 
 
Blake‟s formulation appears to perceive the autonomy principle as a right to autonomy, since 
the entitlement to autonomy is accompanied by a duty to enable those conditions, yet he 
refrains from calling it as such. To argue how coercion infringes upon individual autonomy 
Blake uses of the autonomy definition formulated by Joseph Raz, who claims that three 
conditions are required for autonomous action (Blake, 2002: 268-270 & Raz, 1986: 373). 
These are that (1) the particular individual must have the appropriate mental capabilities, that 
(2) there must be an adequate number of options to choose from, that (3) a choice must be 
independent, it must be free from manipulation and coercion by others. To this definition 
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Blake adds the notion that (4) autonomy can be infringed upon by altering the choices open to 
an individual regardless of the number of options (2002: 270). It should be intuitively clear 
how conditions 2 and 3 are infringed upon by a state‟s laws. They force an individual to 
behave in a particular way or remove some of the options that an individual might choose and 
thereby deny an individual some of his freedom as an autonomous agent. All states infringe 
upon the autonomy of their inhabitants on a regular basis, by exacting punishment on criminal 
offenders, or by taxing their inhabitants for a portion of their property. Yet, even while 
coercion infringes upon autonomy state coercion can be justified (Blake, 2002: 274). Blake‟s 
argument on the justification of coercive power can be formally represented as follows; 
B1: Anticosmopolitan claim on justifiable coercion 
P5 - Individual autonomy is a value that is inconsistent with coercion 
P6 - The state coerces and thereby infringes on individual autonomy 
P7- An infringement on autonomy can be justified if based upon a principle of justice 
Therefore: 
C4 - State coercion can be justified if based on some principle of justice 
The contradiction is that the state is both a hindrance and a constitutive condition for 
autonomous action (Blake, 2002: 265). This is because the state protects individuals from the 
invasion of their autonomy as well, it protects them against arbitrary coercion by others. 
When the previously mentioned coercion principle of liberal legitimacy (p. 6) is perceived in 
light of the impossibility of eliminating state coercion, the argument regarding justifiable 
coercion is complete. The principle referred to in P7 and C4 is the coercion principle of 
liberal legitimacy, which commonly entails the right of democratic participation. The 
argument allows liberal to argue that individuals coerce themselves, as they are given the right 
of participation and have chance to create the laws to which they are themselves subject.   
But what about coercion executed by other agents, such as other basic structures or a global 
basic structure?  Blake acknowledges the existence of a global basic structure which might be 
coercive in „some‟ instances, but because “in the international arena, by contrast, no 
institution comparable to the state exists” this does not give rise to the same concerns of 
justice (Blake, 2002: 265). For Blake it is the coercive national legal system which requires 
justification because it is both necessary and imbued with great power (2002: 263), this does 
not apply to outsiders because they are not members of that state and thus are not subject to its 
laws. The global basic structure lacks the coercive capacity of the state, since there is no 
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world state which coerces individuals like the territorial state does (by virtue of its laws) and 
that as a consequence the scope of justice remains domestic. Blake does not dispute the 
existence of a global basic structure, but rather its capacity to coerce individuals directly. In 
his view global institutions coerce states rather than individuals. An individual is thus 
shielded from direct coercion by other basic structures by the domestic structure of his own 
society. This is not to say that coercion of individuals never happens by another basic 
structure or by a global basic structure. But if it occurs we ought to eliminate it rather than 
seek a justification (Blake, 2002: 280). This is the general approach taken by Blake, eliminate 
coercion if possible and justify if it cannot be removed because it is necessary. Since we 
cannot eliminate the state, because it enables autonomous living, we need to justify it (Blake, 
2002: 265 & 282). To summarize the development of the anticosmopolitan institutionalist 
position, Blake spelled his position very clearly:  
“To insiders, the state says: Yes, we coerce you, but we do so in accordance with 
principles you could not reasonably reject. To outsiders, it says: We do not coerce you, 
and therefore do not apply our principles of liberal justice to you” (2002, 287). 
In response to different criticisms that were leveled against Blake‟s argument for a domestic 
scope of justice he has written a second article, titled; „Coercion and Egalitarian Justice‟ 
(2011). Two assumptions in this article are fundamentally different from his earlier article 
(2002). Firstly, where in his previous article he spoke about the principle of respect for 
autonomy, autonomy is now ascribed the status of a right (2011: 569). This is an important 
departure from Raz, who argued against given autonomy the status of a right (1986: 247). 
And secondly, Blake now assumes that the institutions constituting the global basic structure 
are in fact coercive on a „regular‟ basis (2011: 566). This raises the question how Blake would 
avoid the conclusion that the scope of justice is global. Blake‟s answer to this question 
requires us to distinguish between different forms of coercive associations, between vertical 
and horizontal forms of coercion. With vertical coercion is meant that “The parties to be 
coerced set up an agent” and that “all those who participate in the process of deciding what 
that agent will do are, themselves, subject to the coercive power of that agent” (Blake, 2011: 
566). The agent in this sense is to be understood as a domestic basic structure, and the parties 
as the inhabitants of the basic structure. The second form of coercion, horizontal coercion, 
entails that the parties to be coerced act as both “coercers and coerced” (Blake, 2011: 566). 
The parties involved set up a new organization and are free to join and leave. The signatory 
parties have to coerce each other to comply with the rules that were set up, without any 
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overarching structure. They are, so to say, coercing themselves in a manner equal to that of 
individuals who are members of a basic structure. This is the form of coercion that can be 
seen in the international arena (2011: 567). It can be seen in international treaty organizations 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, the UNHCR or several trade agreements. Thus defined, 
horizontal coercion does not directly touch the lives of individuals living in a particular basic 
structure. The coercion is shielded by their basic structure, which might be coerced but they 
themselves are not.  
Blake is correct that most global institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
United Nations, the Paris Climate Treaty, and all sort of trade agreements, do not directly 
affect individuals. There are however some global institutions that are mandated by their 
signatory members to coerce individuals. For example, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
exacts criminal punishments on inhabitants of its members without mediation. And secondly, 
although indirectly, coercion still takes place. An individual is still affected by decisions taken 
by international organizations, because he is coerced by his national institutions to help repay 
IMF loans to his country for example, or because a trade agreement can put further demands 
on the quality of the products he manufactures. Should we justify, or eliminate, these 
organizations? 
A second author can help distinguish state mandated coercion by international organization 
from domestic coercion and shed light on the way in which individuals are affected by 
horizontal coercion. According to Thomas Nagel (2005) global institutions are created for 
three types of purpose: “that of the protection of human rights, the provision of humanitarian 
aid, and the provision of global public goods that benefit everyone” (Nagel, 2005: 136). The 
proliferation of international organizations puts pressure on domestic basic structures because 
international organizations need to have some coercive power for their policies to be 
effective. As a consequence there appears to be an erosion of state sovereignty to the point 
where one might be tempted to think that the Rawlsian basic structure is already global in 
scope. Yet this is not the case, because contrary to the domestic basic structure, global 
institutions lack the coercive power of nation states (Nagel, 2005: 138). They may still coerce 
individuals, but this is indirectly done through the institution which “represent and bear 
primary responsibility for those individuals” (Nagel, 2005: 138). Coercion is thus filtered, and 
shielded, by the domestic basic structure of which an individual is a member. The essence of 
the argument formulated by Nagel lies in the claim on political legitimacy, and with that to 
legitimate coercive power, which states do make and international organization do not make. 
11 
 
Since international organizations make no claim to legitimacy, they do not pretend to act in 
the name of the people, and as such considerations of justice do not apply to them (Nagel, 
2005: 140). It can be said that they are an additional force by assisting domestic basic 
structures in providing for justice. Coercion of individuals by a global basic structure can thus 
be justified in some cases because it helps domestic basic structures in providing for justice. 
While the domestic structures filter the coercion in order to ensure that is compliant with the 
coercion principle of liberal legitimacy. The domestic structure thus perceived would act as 
the coercing agent towards an individual; this would make the coercion justifiable as it entails 
an additional judgment regarding the legitimacy of the coercion. If the basic structure finds 
the demands of the international organizations to be inconsistent with its own principles of 
justice, it would not execute the demand. Nagel's contribution emphasizes the role of 
domestic basic structures as a safeguard against unlawful coercion, they filter and shield their 
own inhabitants from potential coercion, thereby ensuring the primacy of the domestic basic 
structure. 
As should have become clear from this chapter the anticosmopolitan argument for a domestic 
limitation on the scope of justice stems from the impact and necessity of the territorial state.  
The state requires coercive measures in order to shield individuals from coercion by others. 
This argument echoes earlier liberal philosophers, who argued for the necessity of the state 
based upon the perils of the state of nature. Coercion is inconsistent with autonomy and as 
such we should seek to eliminate it as much as possible. Blake argued that international 
coercion ought to be eliminated, but domestically coercion is a necessary aspect of law which 
can be justified (2011: 567). The scope of justifiable coercion limits the scope of justice, 
which firmly puts the scope and site of justice within the domestic basic structure. While 
anticosmopolitans acknowledge that the global basic structure might act coercive towards 
individuals, this is either justifiable because it is filtered by the domestic basic structure or it 
needs to be eliminated. The arguments of Blake and Nagel make it plausible that the scope of 
justice is domestic. Yet Blake‟s claim (2002, 287) that domestic basic structures do not 
directly coerce outsiders has been disputed by Arash Abizadeh (2007 & 2010). The next 
chapter focuses on his rebuttal of the arguments formulated by Blake, Nagel, and Miller. It 
focuses on the issue of whether states really do not coerce outsiders. 
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Chapter 4: The cosmopolitan response to the coercive basic structure argument 
Thomas Nagel and Michael Blake developed a coercion based argument for a limitation on 
the scope of justice. Yet their arguments were exposed to withering scrutiny by Arash 
Abizadeh (2007). This chapter focuses on his rebuttal and the later debate that ensued 
between Abizadeh (2009) and Miller (2010) regarding the coerciveness of immigration 
policies (2010). It focuses on Abizadeh‟s thesis that the regime of interstate border controls is 
coercive towards outsiders.  
The anticosmopolitan argument hinges on coercion as an instrument to limit the scope of 
justice. This is what made the coercion of outsiders an interesting case for Abizadeh. Because, 
if states do coerce foreigners by means of their immigration policy, this would have to be 
either justified or eliminated according to logic employed by Blake. A justification entails an 
enlargement of the scope of justice to the global level, and elimination of the coercive 
elements of border control policy would remove the sanction entailed within this aspect of 
law. Illegal migrants could no-longer be expulsed.  The laws that were considered by Blake 
were criminal and private law in general, but what about the particular set of laws which 
constitute a nation‟s immigration policy? Could they possibly require a reconsideration of the 
anticosmopolitan claims regarding the scope of justice? 
This is a relevant question because states “use coercion against foreigners on a massive and 
ongoing basis to prevent them from entering their territory at will” (Abizadeh, 2007: 348-
349). And a state, by coercing an individual to stay out of its territory, does “profoundly and 
pervasively affect a person‟s life chances” (Abizadeh, 2007: 350). Abizadeh states that Blake 
recognizes this contingency, that states coerce foreigners to refrain from entering their 
territory, but claims that this form of coercion is different from the sort exercised towards 
inhabitants and does not give rise to the same demand for justification (Blake in Abizadeh, 
2007: 349). To be fair, Blake does not address immigration policies specifically, but rather 
argues that the set of laws which give rise to demand for redistributive justice only hold 
between individuals who are part of the same basic structure due to the inescapability of state 
coercion (2002: 280). The quote Abizadeh uses in this instance is where Blake addresses the 
coercive actions of international institutions, rather than coercion employed by other domestic 
basic structures by virtue of immigration policies.  
Two possible answers could be given by anticosmopolitans to rebut Abizadeh‟s thesis on 
border controls; firstly, that state coercion of inhabitants is different from that of foreigners 
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because only the former group is profoundly and pervasively affected by this basic structure 
(Abizadeh, 2007: 349). And secondly, like Blake has claimed, one can answer that a state 
does not coerce foreigners. Abizadeh finds both answers unconvincing, because the former 
answer can be disproven and the latter is empirically false (Abizadeh, 2007: 350). Regarding 
the first possible answer Abizadeh claims the following; if a state denies a would-be 
immigrant entry, it thereby affects a person‟s life and chances to prosper in a profound way 
(Abizadeh, 2007: 349). And indeed, one only has to skim a European newspaper to be 
burdened by tragic stories about persons and families who look for a better life in Europe; at 
the very least these individuals regard their life‟s prospects to be vastly better in Europe than 
they would be in Syria, Somalia, Eritrea or Pakistan. As such, it cannot be merely the 
pervasive impact which differentiates state coercion of inhabitants from foreigners, because 
an immigrant‟s life-prospects are pervasively impacted by border controls. The 
anticosmopolitan argument requires would need an additional argument to differentiate state 
coercion of inhabitants to the coercion of foreigners.  
Abizadeh suggests that the difference might stem from the distinction between law-governed 
state coercion and lawless state coercion (2007: 350). The former encapsulates justified 
coercion and is perfectly consistent with institutionalist reasoning, but the latter is more akin 
to a state‟s prerogative or rule by decree. When a state does coerce foreigners without 
subjecting the coercion to the coercion principle of liberal legitimacy it is lawless state 
coercion (Abizadeh, 2007: 350). When considering the justify-or-eliminate approach towards 
coercion employed by Blake, with the added notion that immigration policies are coercive to 
foreigners in the sense which normal laws are towards inhabitants, the policy ought to be 
justified to those whom are affected. If it is not justified then, according to Abizadeh, the 
anticosmopolitan argument would boil down to the following claim: 
"We not only coerce you, but we coerce you without subjecting our ongoing coercion 
to the constraints of a legal system and the rule of law, and therefore we have no 
responsibilities of comparative distributive justice to you." (2007: 351).  
When formulated this way the anticosmopolitan argument indeed appears illogical, however 
Abizadeh goes even further by stating that it is perverse, since it removes any pretense of 
accountability regarding the coercion of foreigners (Abizadeh, 2007: 352). For Abizadeh the 
coercive understanding of the basic structure implies that the scope of justice is global 
because of “the interstate system of border coercion and the economic regime it imposes” 
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(2007, 358). His argument poses a thorough indictment of the anticosmopolitan position. If it 
is indeed coercion which defines the scope of justice, it seems arbitrary to limit the 
application of the coercion principle of liberal legitimacy to those organizations which make a 
claim to legitimacy like Nagel has done (2005: 140),  or by denying that foreigners are 
coerced (Blake: 2002, 287). When following Blake‟s earlier treatment of coercion we would 
have to either justify it, entailing an enlargement of the scope of justice. Or it would have to 
be eliminated, implying the abolition of immigration policies. Both conclusions would not be 
very appealing to anticosmopolitans. By introducing the particular instance of law which is 
immigration policy Abizadeh skillfully introduces another issue into the global basic structure 
debate, the democratic boundary problem. However, Abizadeh only distinguished between 
law-governed and lawless state coercion, between justified and unjustified coercion. This 
distinction appears to be too blunt a judgment tool to cover all instances of state coercion.  
In a quest to tackle the democratic boundary problem, David Miller introduced a further 
refinement on the coerciveness of law, in this case between preventive laws and actual action-
inducing coercion (2009: 220). Like others before him, Miller equates the scope of justice 
with the scope of coercion (2009: 218). However, he disputes Abizadeh‟s thesis on the 
coerciveness of border policy, because a border policy is not an action inducing coercive 
policy, but rather a preventive policy (Miller, 2009: 220). The key to understanding the 
difference is captured in the following quote: 
“Coercion means that there is some course of action that the agent is forced to take; 
prevention means that some course of action that might otherwise have been available 
is now blocked” (Miller, 2009: 220). 
Miller‟s definition perceives coercion as the sort which Grant Lamond dubbed action-
inducing coercion, which means that an individual, by virtue of the coercive act, is forced into 
performing a certain action (Lamond, 2000: 47). At first glance, one could argue that as 
prevention entails the removal of one of the options open to an individual, it would still entail 
an infringement on the range of options to be chosen and thus infringe on an individual‟s 
autonomy. But this is not the case in Miller‟s conception of coercion. To properly explain the 
difference between prevention and coercion we have to return to the conditions for 
autonomous action. One of the conditions is that of independence in choice, one has to be able 
to choose freely from „a range of options‟, Raz‟s third condition for autonomous action 
(Miller, 2010: 112). However for Miller removing one of the options does not compromise an 
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individual‟s independence to choose between the remaining options. It does affect the number 
of options but if enough are left open this does not pose an issue (Miller, 2010: 113). The 
crucial difference is that Miller defines coercion as an act of action-inducing coercion, 
intended make someone to do something, it makes the „person coerced into an instrument of 
the coercers will”, whereas prevention not necessarily do any such thing (Miller, 2009: 219; 
& 2010: 114). Preventive laws are thus not coercive in the sense that they force someone to 
do something. The result in the case of non-compliance is the same, actual coercion, but 
there‟s a difference between a law allowing one option and a law removing one option. The 
law forcing persons to drive on one side of the road allows one option, but an immigration 
policy merely removes one option. Miller‟s argument to differentiate prevention from 
coercion can be found in the following quote (2010: 117):  
“Coercion requires intention and the preventing state intends only that he should not 
enter its own territory unauthorized, not that he should remain in his country of origin”  
It is important to note that the above does not imply that preventive laws do not require 
justification, they still interfere in the set of options open to an individual, but since this it 
does not hamper autonomy like coercion does it, does not have to be democratic justification 
(Miller, 2010: 115). This assuming an immigrant still has a reasonable range of alternatives.  
In the eyes of Miller, Abizadeh conflates actual coercion with hypothetical coercion (Miller, 
2010: 115). A border policy does not coerce „all‟ would-be immigrants, but only those who 
persist in their choice to enter a specific territory for others the threat of coercion remains 
hypothetical (2010: 116). The autonomy of foreigners who want to enter but who still have an 
adequate range of options open to them is not infringed upon, as such the preventive policy 
would not need to be justified to them. Prevention interferes with their freedom to choose, and 
that requires a justification. But Miller denies that their autonomy is compromised and that 
they have been coerced (2010: 117). This is because prevention does not subject a person to 
the will of another as coercion does, for Miller that is the crucial aspect of coercion which 
gives rise to the justificatory demand (2010: 117 - 118).  
Abizadeh disagreed with these claims, and responded that if Miller remains committed to his 
argument that immigration policies are not coercive towards outsiders, then “instead of 
repelling my thesis about what democracy requires for borders, he has simply evacuated the 
terrain of democratic theory” (Abizadeh, 2010: 127 - 128). This a very strong claim, but based 
on Abizadeh‟s thesis that all whom are subject to coercion ought to be given the right of 
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democratic participation (the coercion principle of liberal legitimacy), it would indeed appear 
odd that this right should be withheld from a portion of those whom are coerced (2010: 122). 
Obviously he was not convinced by Miller‟s argument, and this stemmed from the way Miller 
construed his argument regarding preventive policies. In order to explain, this Abizadeh 
argues that laws coercive capacity stems not from forcing a single option upon an individual, 
but rather that law can be coercive in three ways: 
“Its agents sometimes subject individuals to (1) non-communicative direct coercion 
(coercive acts); its laws subject individuals to (2) non-communicative legal coercion 
(in authorizing coercive acts); and (3) its laws subject individuals to communicative 
legal coercion (in threatening punitive harms)” (Abizadeh, 2010: 123). 
In his earlier response Miller distinguished preventive policies from coercive policies. This 
distinction is irrelevant for Abizadeh, as both are instances of law and thus coercive in one of 
the above three ways. The root of laws coerciveness stems from its adoption (non-
communicative legal coercion), which entails the legitimization of coercive action regardless 
of whether it‟s executed. It thereby induces pressure upon one‟s free will and thus infringes 
upon one‟s freedom to choose. In fact, construed this way it is not relevant how many 
alternatives are left, as all laws contain the above-mentioned forms of coercion (Abizadeh, 
210: 123). For Abizadeh, laws are not coercive because they are carried out but because they 
authorize the conditional use of force (2010: 123). This claim regarding the justificatory 
burden arising as a consequence of a law‟s adoption will henceforth be known as the adoption 
claim.  
Abizadeh blames Miller for making a conceptual error; the avoidable coercion contained in 
preventive policies still contains the threat of coercive interference. By not entering a territory 
an immigrant is still subjected to coercion, just not coerced in the physical sense. The 
difference between coercion and being subject to coercion is a relevant analytical distinction, 
because it significantly increases the range of actions which classify as coercive. As such, 
regardless of the degree in which laws infringe upon autonomy, they subject others to 
coercion and thus require justification. The key lies in the authorization of force, rather than 
measure of infringement on the option-scheme open to an individual.  
Miller bases his argument regarding preventive policies largely upon an analogy to property 
laws, he argues that it is unclear how a law against unlawful entry in houses can be said to be 
coercive. It removes the legitimate entry to one house, but there are many options left to 
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choose. It is only when a burglar persists in his plan to enter a house that he will be coerced to 
refrain from executing that plan (Miller, 2010: 115). This analogy fits the way a migrant can 
attempt to unlawfully enter a territory (Miller, 2010: 117). The problem with using property 
laws as an example is that a lot of laws are equal in design to property laws; they burden 
individuals with a negative obligation to refrain from an action. Abizadeh questions whether 
this implies that all property laws containing negative obligations are exempted from the 
justificatory burden, or indeed all laws containing negative obligations (Abizadeh, 2010: 127). 
For Abizadeh the distinction between laws containing positive or negative obligations is 
irrelevant, as it is not the application of law but its formulation that needs to be justified 
(2010: 126 -127). And in the case of the burglar, this would mean that it is not the application 
of law that gives rise to the justificatory burden, but rather the formulation of the law against 
illegitimate entry.  
This brings us back to Abizadeh‟s conclusion that if Miller commits to his thesis that 
preventive policies do not require democratic justification, he exempts a whole range of laws 
imposing negative obligations from the coercion principle of liberal legitimacy and thereby 
abandons democratic theory (2010: 128). Both agree that the threat of coercion contained in 
preventive policies reduces the freedom to choose if they fail to leave open an adequate range 
of options (Abizadeh, 2010: 125; & Miller, 2010: 115). But they disagree on the magnitude of 
the justificatory demand put upon preventive laws and the point at which the justificatory 
burden comes into play. To conclude this chapter I would like to state that Abizadeh has 
provided a compelling argument against the anticosmopolitan claims. Against Blake, 
Abizadeh argued that the interlocking system of border controls forms a global basic structure 
akin to that of the domestic basic structure in its coerciveness. Secondly, against Nagel, he 
argues that since coercion defines the scope of justice, the additional claim to legitimacy 
removes some coercive measures from democratic oversight. And finally, against Miller‟s 
claim that preventive policies are not coercive, he pits the argument that it is not the 
application of a law that gives rise to the justificatory demand, but it is a the point of the 
formulation of a law where coercive actions are legitimized and thus needs to be justified. 
Although Abizadeh‟s argument is internally consistent with the argument used by 
institutionalist anticosmopolitans, his conclusion appears overly demanding. The coercion 
principle of liberal legitimacy with the added notion of the adoption claim would imply that I 
am to be included in the scope of all basic structures around the world. It would mean that as 
all inhabitants of the globe are potentially coerced, and thus hypothetically subject to 
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coercion, all are owed a justification and should be included within the scope of justice (Risse, 
2006: 680). However, I believe that the version of the institutionalist anticosmopolitan 
argument deserves more credit than Abizadeh is willing to give, and this will be shown in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Coercion and Autonomy 
The relation between coercion and autonomy appears to be of fundamental importance in the 
debate, but it has been assumed without scrutiny thus far. The authors whose arguments were 
treated have all used the definition of autonomy as was developed by Joseph Raz. Yet they 
departed from his work in one important aspect, the importance which choice has in relation 
to autonomy. In this chapter I will argue that the importance of the autonomy principle is 
overstated. The focus on autonomy as „freedom from coercion‟ has overstated the importance 
of autonomy in relation to another concept, that of self-authorship. This fixation on the 
autonomy principle allowed Abizadeh to reach his conclusion that being subject to coercion 
equals an autonomy infringement. I will return to Raz‟s original argument regarding why it 
should not be given the status of a right to in order to substitute the view of autonomy as 
„freedom from coercion,‟ to autonomy as „self-authorship.‟ Secondly, I will show that when 
Raz‟s definition of autonomy is used instead of the autonomy principle, we can dispute 
Abizadeh‟s conclusion that being subject to coercion by virtue of immigration policies equals 
an autonomy infringement. This will allow anticosmopolitans to deny that the scope of justice 
is global. 
I will start the chapter with some preliminary boundaries on the range of arguments to be 
considered. First, both Abizadeh and Blake are committed to the thesis that coercion always 
invades autonomy (Blake, 2002: 272) & (Abizadeh, 2008: 40), however Miller attempted to 
differentiate law in general from preventive law by claiming that the latter does not 
necessarily invade autonomy (2009: 113). The main disagreement was about whether 
immigration policies infringe upon condition 2 for autonomous action (p.7). Secondly, the 
version of the basic structure debate that is considered thus far rest upon the claim that 
coercion is wrong because it infringes upon autonomy. The claim that coercion is wrong 
because it is inconsistent with a certain moral value indicates that the debate centers around a 
moralized baseline account of coercion. The relevant moral baseline to decide whether an 
action counts as coercive can be found in the autonomy principle on p.7 (Blake, 2002: 267. 
The baseline is thus a situation where an individual is free from autonomy infringements by 
others. Thirdly, the focus is not on the coerciveness of laws in general but rather on the 
specific set of laws which form an immigration policy. Abizadeh‟s sketches immigration 
policies as a set of unilaterally imposed policies of entry, movement, immigration, and 
naturalization which are designed to have coercive parts (Abizadeh, 2008: 37).  
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For Blake, coercion was necessarily inconsistent with autonomy (as was seen in P5). This was 
a departure from Joseph Raz‟s seminal work on autonomy (1986), who argued that one can 
exist in the presence of another (Raz, 1986: 408). Blake, in contrast with Raz, also promoted 
individual autonomy to the status of a right (Blake, 2011: 569). Raz was opposed this right 
because it would be too burdensome on others. He start with the assumption that claims that 
rights generate duties for others (Raz, 1986: 170 & 247), the right of one individual burdens 
another with the duty to provide for that right. I think it will be safe to assume that Blake 
shares this assumption. Raz specifies the conditions of entitlement to a right as follows (1986, 
166).  
 X has a right: “if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an 
aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other 
person(s) to be under a duty.” 
Joseph Raz refrained from attributing autonomy the status of right because it would be overly 
demanding if it were so. For him “the interest of one person cannot justify holding so many to 
be subject to potentially burdensome duties” (Raz, 1986: 247). The right to autonomy would 
burden others with duties which go beyond mere non-interference, beyond refraining for 
coercion. Instead they would have a duty to arrange the conditions required for autonomous 
living (Raz, 1986: 408). If we accept Abizadeh‟s argument on the coerciveness of 
immigration policies, and the autonomy principle, then all domestic basic structures in the 
world have a duty towards a particular individual to provide for him the conditions necessary 
for autonomous living (2007, 324). This would severely burden all domestic basic structures 
and appears overly demanding in Raz‟s terms. 
Secondly, more importantly, and in direct contrast to Blake‟s autonomy principle (p.9), Raz 
warned against identifying autonomy as a right against coercion (1986, 207). Rather it should 
be seen as a derivate right to the right of freedom (seen as positive freedom) (1986, 408-409). 
Infringements on autonomy matter only insomuch as they hamper others in their positive 
freedom to live a good life. Blake‟s continued emphasis on the autonomy principle obscures 
why autonomy matters. It matters because it is a constitutive condition for pursuing one‟s 
pervasive life goals. It is intrinsically valuable because it allows people to shape their lives to 
their own desires (Raz, 1986: 409). The notion of self-authorship of one‟s life is of 
fundamental importance in understanding why autonomy matters. It perceives the 
autonomous person as part author of his own life, a person who is able to make plans and to 
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realize them if he so desires. Put bluntly, “a person‟s life is autonomous if it is too a 
considerable extent his own creation” (Raz, 1986: 408). It does not follow from this that an 
autonomous life is necessarily inconsistent with coercion. If one is coerced to drive on one 
side of the road this takes away one option, but his autonomy is not infringed upon because he 
is still able and capable to be the author of his own life. Likewise, my autonomy is not 
infringed upon if I happen to grow a strong desire into wrong-way driving, because I still have 
relevant options left. The autonomy principle fails to capture this essential importance of 
autonomy and thereby overstates the importance of coercion on autonomy. The differences 
between Raz and Blake have implications for what counts as a coercive act, because Raz 
perceives the moral baseline of an autonomous person differently. For Blake the expected 
moral baseline is a life free from autonomy infringements (Blake, 2002: 288). But for Raz the 
moral baseline would be a life where one can be the author of his own life, and one can still 
possess and realize that capacity in the presence of state coercion. 
For Blake coercion necessarily infringes upon autonomy (P5), even though some forms are 
justifiable because they enable autonomy (2002: 263). In contrast with this position, perceived 
in Raz‟s terms an autonomous person requires choices to be able to realize his life goals, these 
choices need to be both varied and adequate, they need to contain both short and long term 
option, and both pervasive and trivial choices (1986: 373-377). But this does not require the 
presence of any particular one (1986, 410). The number of options or their magnitude is not 
the overarching measure of autonomy infringements, these infringements are measured by 
how much the removal of an option hampers the capacity of an individual to be the author of 
his own life. The problem with Blake‟s autonomy principle is summarized by Mattias Risse 
(2006: 680): 
 “If it is because of the autonomy principle that coercion requires justification, 
anything requires justification that constrains whether, or to what extent, people have a 
reasonable range of options to choose from”  
Blake‟s construal of the autonomy principle overstates the importance of choice in the 
capacity of an individual to live an autonomous life. If instead we perceive autonomy, as Raz 
does, as the capacity to be the author of one‟s own life, the removal of certain options 
becomes less of an issue. As an individual is still able to live autonomously even if certain 
options are removed. Is this individual‟s autonomy, all other things equal, infringed upon by 
being subject to coercion from other basic structures? Abizadeh would answer this question 
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positively, because a state removes an option which pervasively impacts an individual‟s life 
chances (p.13) & (Abizadeh, 2007: 348). But does a state really affect a person‟s life chances 
by denying him a resident permit as strongly as Abizadeh suggests? Consider the following 
three examples which will be used to show that only a person‟s life chances are pervasively 
impacted by immigration policies only in certain situations. 
 Example 1 - The just dad: Consider my father who required crutches to walk, he would 
sometimes jokingly threaten to hit me with those crutches if I did something wrong. My dad 
was just, as he only coerced me whenever I try to do something stupid like theft, vandalism, 
or bullying my sister. I also required my coercive dad as he prevented arbitrary bullying by 
my sister. And to make things easier for us he has written down all the rules that apply, voiced 
them to us, and allows us to vote on new rules every couple years. Beyond me developing an 
interest in bullying my sister or destroying our house I was free to develop my own desires, 
make plans, and be the author of my own life. This situation equals the normal circumstances 
of a person living his life in within a particular basic structure. There is coercion, but I am free 
to be the author of my own life. There are other dads, but I am free to move there as their 
houses are all open to whoever wants to enter. Yet that option is of trivial importance to me. If 
I were to stay in my basic structures some options would be removed, but these are justified 
because I am allowed to vote about them. 
Example 2 – A world of just dads: Now consider a second example, the same as the above. 
But at one point I‟ve decided that another dad, who unfortunately also walks on crutches but 
has a recently renovated house, would be a nicer father. I really want to move there but 
unfortunately the rooms are taken by the children of that particular father. He has told me to 
me that I cannot move there because his house is full. He thereby removed the option for me 
to migrate there legally, his threats are credible, and he has subjected me to coercion. I am 
less free than I was before I developed an interest in moving to another house, because one 
option grew enormously important. I cannot migrate, but am still able to create and execute 
plans in my own house. 
Example 3 – A world with some just and some unjust dads: Now consider the same situation, 
but my dad is vehemently unjust. He denies me the ability to play soccer, forces me to work 
in the yard after school, and denies me my pocket money which he gives to my sister instead. 
On top of that he allows my sister to bully me, but hits me with his crutches every time I try to 
take revenge. After enduring my situation for a couple years I hear of another dad who acts 
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like the one in the first example. Convinced that my life‟s prospects are better there I decide 
to migrate. Would the receiving dad be justified to deny me entry into his house using the 
same argument as in the second example? I think not, because by denying me entry he 
pervasively impacts my life‟s prospects. He denies me the chance to be the author of my own 
life by denying me entry.  
If we perceive autonomy in Blake‟s terms, as the freedom from external constraints, my 
autonomy is infringed upon in all three examples. Yet only in the first and second examples is 
this justified to me by the coercing agent, because I am given a right to vote in return. 
However, if we view autonomy as Raz does, then only the third example would count as 
coercive. In the second example I am autonomous and free, even in the presence of coercion 
by other basic structures. And if I want to migrate and denied entry, I would still be able to 
live freely and autonomously in my own basic structure. In the third example I would be 
denied that capacity by both my resident domestic structure and the structure I intend to 
migrate to, as such it would be viewed as coercive by both all authors.  
If we accept Abizadeh‟s argument my autonomy is infringed in the second and third examples 
because I am subject to coercion, yet only in the third example are my life‟s chances 
pervasively impacted by this denial. My argument against Abizadeh is that his empirical 
premise against Blake is misconstrued (p.13) & (Abizadeh, 2007: 349 - 350), a person‟s life 
chances are not pervasively impacted by a strong desire to move somewhere under normal 
conditions (as in example 2). It is only in example 3, where the resident basic structure denies 
me my capacity to be the author of my own life, that a country would pervasively impact that 
my life‟s prospects by denying me a resident permit. But in example 3 I would be classified as 
a refugee rather than a migrant. Secondly, if Blake‟s autonomy principle is substituted by 
Raz‟s autonomy as self-authorship my autonomy is not infringed by the coercion from other 
basic structures (as in example 2), because I still possess the capacity and faculties for self-
authorship. And thirdly, example 2 deliberately did not contain a world full of closed houses.  
We should not take the extreme examples of the immigration policy of Australia & (Baker & 
Nixon, 2017), or the United States proposed entry denial plan (Cave, 2017), and claim that the 
whole world consists of states harboring similar policies. It suffices to state that Abizadeh‟s 
sketch of immigration policies exaggerates the stringency of these policies and the number of 
states which have stringent immigration policies. But the exact nature of immigration policies 
and their stringency is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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The option of migration might, as in example 2, someday be very important. But this is true of 
all things where I am motivated by a strong desire to be or do something. However, the 
removal of that option pervasively impacts my life only in the sense that I had a strong desire 
to migrate, but it not impact my life because I am denied the capacity to be the author of my 
own life in my resident basic structure. Of course any option might become of pervasive 
impact for a particular individual at some point. But to me this appears to be sheer choice 
fetishism, and to quote Onora O‟Neil; “when decision becomes king there is little left to 
admire in its majesty” (2009, 39). The choice and quality of options, Raz‟s second condition, 
is of importance only in relation to the value of self-authorship, and an individual is not 
hampered in that capacity by being subject to coercion from other basic structures. He is thus 
still subject to coercion, but it does not infringe upon his autonomy.  
This brings us to the discussion between Miller and Abizadeh regarding the measure of 
autonomy infringement of preventive policies. To recall, Abizadeh claimed if a state denies a 
would-be immigrant entry, it thereby affects a person‟s life and chances to prosper in a 
profound way (Abizadeh, 2007: 349).  The three examples serve to dispute this claim, because 
an individual‟s life chances are only profoundly impacted by entry-denial if he is also denied 
these chances in the country where he is migrating from. Example 2 shows that when 
autonomy is understood in Raz‟s terms, under normal circumstances a person‟s capacity and 
ability to be the author of his own life are not impacted severely enough by immigration 
policies to classify as an autonomy infringement. Yes an option is removed, but so to say, if 
you cannot be an actor in Hollywood you might still become one in Bollywood.  
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Conclusion 
The basic structure debate is wide and expansive, it covers several other debates. The first 
analogy that springs to mind is that of a philosophical jungle of arguments and viewpoints 
spanning forty years. Some of the topics which were touched by the debate are the democratic 
boundary problem, the justificatory demands of coercion, liberal and democratic thought, the 
moral arbitrariness of borders and foremost the issue of defining the scope of justice. This 
thesis attempted to contribute to the debate by identifying the key disputed issue in the 
coercive branch of the basic structure debate and focusing on a particular contested issue, the 
relation between coercion and autonomy, and between choice and autonomy in particular. 
Blake‟s emphasis on the autonomy principle as a right, and on autonomy as „freedom from 
coercion,‟ obscured why it matters. Autonomy matters because it enables a life worth living, 
but that can be so even in the presence of coercion. Raz‟s perception of autonomy as self-
authorship has shown that one can be free to pursue certain life courses, even if others are 
excluded. If his argument is adopted then coercion does not necessarily infringe upon 
autonomy, and severing the link has allowed me to dispute that immigration policies infringe 
upon autonomy, even though they might be coercive. The measure of infringement is 
dependent upon the situation of the individual.  
Disputing Abizadeh‟s conclusion does come at the price of lowering the autonomy principle 
from a right to a constitutive condition to freedom. And it alters the baseline of the expected 
course of events from a life free from coercion, to a life where one can be the author and 
executor of his own plan‟s and desires. That an individual might not be free to move 
somewhere does not mean that he is incapable to live a life worth living somewhere else, 
unless he is denied this capacity in his resident basic structure. However, I do not want to 
open my argument to a similar critique as the one which Abizadeh employed against Miller, 
that I am exempting a host of laws from the justificatory burden (p15) & (Abizadeh, 2010: 
127 - 128). What I aimed to show was that under normal circumstances the autonomy 
infringement from foreign immigration policies is insignificant, because it does not hamper 
someone‟s capacity to be the author of his own life in his own basic structure.  
I concede that the answer posed in this thesis is incomplete, as there are many more 
arguments to consider. The rebuttal of P5 and a different perception of autonomy have 
allowed me to dispute Abizadeh‟s conclusion, but it leaves room for other arguments 
regarding, for example, the coerciveness of the international property regime (Cavallero, 
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2009), the arbitrariness of boundaries (Beitz, 1975), or the problems with Raz‟s argument 
against a right to autonomy (Hassoun, 2011). As such I concede that the increased emphasis 
autonomy as self-authorship will not end the debate, but it will not be due to an argument that 
immigration policies necessarily infringe upon autonomy and thus require justification. 
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